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ICT professionals should be concerned about the use made of their artefacts. ICT enable workplace surveillance 
on an unprecedented scale and increasingly at a level that no employee activity can escape it. We cannot expect 
employees and employers to formulate an agreed set of rules regarding privacy and surveillance rights that are 
considered fair or just to both. The reality is that there exists an asymmetrical distribution of power that favours 
the employers and so they would prevail. This paper suggests an approach to resolving the conflicting interests 
associated with workplace privacy and surveillance. It suggests the discourse be in terms of justice and applies 
Rawls theory of distributive justice. It then evaluates the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 of New South Wales. 
It is one of the few examples of specific workplace surveillance legislation in the world. It finds that when 
evaluated against Rawls fair rules it is seriously deficient and represents a missed opportunity to resolve the 
conflicting interests. 
Keywords 
Workplace surveillance, workplace privacy, distributive justice 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of workplace surveillance is not new. The idea of personal privacy is not new either. In ancient Rome 
transparency of home and work arrangements was central to that society. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, 
village life had always been communal where the concepts of individualism and personal privacy were foreign. 
Even after the industrial revolution life in the cities was still closely regulated and communal. However, in the 
west the concept of Human Rights was developed and personal privacy was included. The concept of Human 
Rights has been increasingly expanded in the post WW2 period to the present. Even then we must remember that 
in that period workplace surveillance was the norm. The time and motion era of Taylor is one example1. 
Surveillance extended beyond the workplace. Henry Ford’s “sociological department” visited homes of 
employees to determine whether they gambled, drank or sent money to foreign relatives. The policy of 
workplace surveillance and the use of technology to enable it is not a recent phenomenon. It is a truism but 
information and communications technologies (ICT) enable workplace surveillance on an unprecedented  scale 
and increasingly at a level that no employee activity can escape it. Refer to the Schulman (2001) study and the 
American Management Association (2005) annual survey of workplace monitoring and surveillance for 
example. 
ICT professionals should be concerned about the use made of their artefacts. They should be professionally and 
ethically obliged to not participate in the design and use of an artefact that will harm. In a addition they have an 
obligation to inform other professionals and members of society of the relevant issues associated with the use of 
ICT. At times this obligation extends to political intervention, either individually or collectively through a 
Professional Body, to influence the State or private organisations to undertake or not undertake an action. 
Workplace surveillance is a sub set of surveillance prevalent in today’s society. ICT provides the capability to 
create a Panopticon society.2 A police state characterised by omniscient surveillance and mechanical law 
enforcement. The so-called “war on terror” has accelerated this trend. The ultimate impact will be the virtual 
(excuse the pun) disappearance of privacy. However, this paper is concerned with workplace surveillance. 
Specifically, after Itrona (2004) it suggests that the discourse should be in terms of justice and particularly 
applies Rawls theory of distributive justice (1958) and (1971). It then evaluates the recent Workplace 
                                                 
1
 Parenti (2003) has documented America’s history of surveillance and repression from the pre civil war period 
to the war on terror. 
2
 The 18th century utopian philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon was a prison designed so jailers could 
observe all prisoners at any time but the prisoners were unaware when they were being observed. 
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Surveillance Act (2005) of New South in accordance with Rawls theory. It then discuses useful lessons for 
others who need to address the issue of workplace privacy and surveillance. 
BACKGROUND 
It is always important to define the important entities under investigation and the scope of the discussion and this 
area is no exception. Accordingly we need to at least address the entities of privacy, workplace and surveillance. 
Privacy International (2003) reviews some of the definitions offered for privacy. They range from the simplest 
offered by Louis Brandeis in the 1890s as “the individuals right to be left alone” to the more contemporary 
Robert Ellis Smith who defines privacy as “the desire by each of us for physical space where we can be free of 
interruption, intrusion, embarrassment, or accountability and the attempt to control the time and manner of 
disclosures of personal information about ourselves”. The Calcutt Committee in the United Kingdom (1990) 
stated that they were unable to find a wholly satisfactory statutory definition of privacy. Nevertheless, they 
believed it could be defined legally as “the right of the individual to be protected against intrusion into his 
personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means or by publication of information”. 
Traditionally, privacy has been viewed as a Human Right and the United Nations Declaration of Human Right in 
article 12 states “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks”. 
Privacy International (2003) provides a useful framework for consideration of the concept of privacy. It 
identifies four separate but related dimensions. First, information privacy involves the establishment of rules 
governing the collection and handling of personal data such as credit, medical and government. Second, bodily 
privacy concerns the protection of a person’s physical self against invasive procedures like genetic testing, drug 
testing and cavity searches. Third, communications privacy includes the security and privacy of mail, telephones, 
e-mail and other communication forms. Finally, territorial privacy concerns the setting of limits on intrusion into 
the domestic and other environments such as the workplace or public space. This includes searches, video 
surveillance and identity checks. 
In this paper our major concern is with handling of personal data and communications. Obviously we are also 
concerned with “territorial privacy” as we need to be able to define “workplace” and distinguish it from other 
spaces like “domestic” or “public”. As a starting point if you access the internet a number of definitions are 
returned. They include: 
o the workplace includes but is not limited to the physical work site, restrooms, cafeterias, training 
sessions, business travel, conferences, work related social gatherings, etc.  
o "Workplace" means any plant, yard, premises, room or other place where an employee or employees 
are engaged in the performance of labor or service over which the employer has the right of access 
or control. 
o a place where work is done; "he arrived at work early today"   
o Workplace means a place (whether or not within or forming part of a building, structure, or vehicle) 
where any person is to work, is working, for the time being works, or customarily works, for gain or 
reward; and in relation to an employee, includes a place, or part of a place, under the control of the 
employer (not being domestic accommodation provided for the employee).  
Like Privacy it is difficult to find a wholly satisfactory definition of “workplace”. The key notions are a place 
where work is performed, it is performed for gain or reward and at a place rightfully under the control or access 
of an employer. Work for gain or reward can however be performed at an employee’s home. Whether this is 
included as a “workplace” seems to depend on the whether an employer has the right of “control or access”. This 
right would probably apply where an employee is using employer-provided resources like a computer. Would it 
apply if it was employee-provided resources? In order to answer this question we need a definition of “work”. 
The Surveillance Act (2005) of NSW defines “at work” for purposes of the legislation. It states that an employee 
is at work for an employer when the employee is at a workplace of an employer whether or not the employee is 
actually performing work at the time or at any place while performing work for the employer. In the latter case if 
work is performed “at home” regardless of who provides the resources it would appear to come under the act. 
Thus, what may be regarded as a “domestic space”, like an employees home, may at least in part and for some 
period of time be considered a “workplace” and therefore subject to access or control of the employer. 
Again defining the concept of workplace surveillance is not as straightforward as would first appear. 
Surveillance is not primarily of the “workplace” as such but rather the employee “at work”. Workplace 
surveillance refers to the formal and informal practices of monitoring and recording aspects of an individual 
17th Australasian Conference on Information Systems Workplace Privacy 
6-8 Dec 2006, Adelaide  Sandy 
 
employee or group of employers “at work”. The NSW Act makes a distinction between Covert and Overt 
Surveillance but curiously does not explicitly define the latter. Covert Surveillance basically means that the 
employee is not formally made aware of the surveillance. Overt Surveillance, by implication, means that the 
employer is formally made aware of the surveillance. Employers choose to undertake surveillance for many 
reasons but basically it is for the purpose of making some judgement about an employee’s behaviour. The 
judgement may be about appropriateness or whether it is productive or desirable. 
In summary, the key concepts are not easy to define. For purposes of this paper we believe that the concept of 
privacy that encompasses the four dimensions, previously referred to, is useful. Again we believe that a 
“workplace” must be where the employer has a right of control or access. Finally, surveillance refers to those 
formal and informal practices of monitoring and recording aspects of an individual employee or groups of 
employees at work. 
Given these understandings, can we expect employees and employers to formulate an agreed set of rules 
regarding privacy and surveillance rights that is considered fair or just to both. With few exceptions we assert the 
answer is no. Employees and employers have competing interests or in our case competing rights. Employees 
have the right to privacy and employers have the right to undertake surveillance of the employee in the 
workplace. The reality is that an asymmetrical distribution of power exists which favours the employers and so 
they would prevail. Also in many workplaces each party views each other with suspicion and more 
fundamentally do not trust each other. See for instance the important work of Mayer and others (1995) regarding 
trust. As result it is unlikely that both parties can formulate a set of just rules to which they both agree. For 
employers to use their dominant power to force employees to “agree” to surveillance would leave them angry 
and aggrieved. 
At the risk of simplification philosophers essentially view ethical behaviour in terms of the golden rule “do to 
others as you would have them do to you”. If this was followed in workplace relations then there is a greater 
probability of formulating a just set of rules. Employers would sensitively provide for greater workplace privacy. 
They would do so because they put themselves in the place of the employee who desires greater workplace 
privacy. Alternatively employees would recognise the employer’s need to monitor and record certain employee 
activities.  Every right has a commensurate obligation for the recipient to behave ethically. We know that 
unethical behaviour by employees is prevalent and gives rise to the employers demand for increased surveillance 
to counter such behaviour. The reality is, particularly in the workplace, that the golden rule is seldom or at best 
imperfectly followed. We know that worldwide there are concerns that employee privacy is increasingly 
violated. The use of ICT enables this increased violation as it becomes more sophisticated, relatively cheap and 
easy to install and use 
This paper suggests an alternative approach to resolving the conflicting interests associated with workplace 
privacy and surveillance. It suggests the discourse be in terms of justice and applies Rawls theory of distributive 
justice. In such an environment the type of technology and its level of sophistication becomes largely irrelevant. 
RAWLS THEORY OF JUSTICE 
Rawls theory of justice as fairness is offered as a means to assist us with the practical issue of evaluating some 
action, rule or institution. A problem is that these will involve good effects for some but bad effects for others. 
There are conflicting interests. In terms of the issue addressed here the conflict is essentially between the privacy 
interests of employees against the organisational goals of the employers. Surveillance can assist organisational 
goals in terms of effective and efficient resource allocation but can violate the privacy of the organisation’s 
employees. Distributive justice is a means by which rules of justice may be used to make decisions, in this case 
about workplace surveillance. Our key question is what is a fair distribution of privacy and surveillance rights? 
Rawls adopts the concepts of the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance” in his theory of justice. It is only 
behind the “veil of ignorance” that the rules of justice can be developed. In the “original position” participants 
choose rules they consider would have the best effect. However, they choose these rules ignorant about 
themselves and context. For instance they do not know if they are an employee or employer and therefore their 
relative power in the organisational context. In other situations participants would be ignorant of gender, age, 
physical strength etc. The motive of the participants is not fairness or some net increase in happiness (after the 
manner of utilitarianism) 3 but self interest which is much more pragmatic. Nor do we have to rely on each 
participant following the “golden rule”. 
                                                 
3
 Rawls disagree with the utilitarianism as it ignores the subordination of one group to another so long as the net 
outcome of a choice is good. Rawls believed justice to be violated by acceptance of any degree of subordination 
so long as the good is increased. 
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What rules are likely to formulated from the perspectives of an employee and an employer? Introna (2004) 
suggests the following and addresses them in terms of the individual and collective perspective and is 
summarised here. Employees out of self interest would suggest rules that would limit all forms of capturing data 
about themselves and their activities.  There are two main reasons for this. First, is an acceptance that there are 
no such things as neutral or objective judgements. Surveillance information would be incorporated into the 
judgement process with a risk it will not serve the employees interest. Second, is the recognition that an 
employee usually lacks the power of the employer and therefore is weaker in bargaining for the fair use of the 
information once captured. If surveillance information was captured then as a fall back the employees would 
suggest rules to ensure maximum control over what information is captured, who is able to access it, how it is 
used etc. 
Employers would make rules for the complete and comprehensive capture of the activities and use of the 
organisations resources by employees. This is considered necessary to ensure the goals of the organisation are 
achieved. This depends on effective and efficient resource usage of all employees and for the benefit of the 
organisation only. These rules would ensure maximum control over the capture of data and activities for every 
employee. 
Before we identify the likely rules for distributing workplace privacy and surveillance rights generated in the 
“original position” behind the “veil of ignorance” there is one other important relevant concept. In the “original 
position” Rawls argues that participants would choose two principles of justice, lexically ordered. One affirms 
the equality of basic rights and the other that views inequalities according to the “difference principle”. This 
principle states that an inequality is unjust except insofar as it is a necessary means to improving the position of 
the worst-off members of society. However, it is not enough to say inequalities act as incentives it has to be 
demonstrated that a degree of inequality is necessary to achieve a high level of welfare for the lowest group in 
society. Rawls believes that these principles are necessary to ensure those participants behind the “veil of 
ignorance” will produce a set of just (fair) rules for distributing these rights. He believes people in the “original 
position” will select the “difference principle” because what they want is their own individual (selfish) welfare. 
What restricts their egoism is that they do not know what arrangement favours them over others. So they play 
safe. 
Most would agree that in organisations the individual employee (and even when collectivised as unions) have 
less power than individual employers (or groups of employers or their representative bodies). It is therefore 
difficult to argue that in terms of the “difference principle” it is the employee that is the “worst off” in terms of 
securing fairness over privacy in the workplace. It is therefore highly likely that participants behind the “veil of 
ignorance” will formulate rules with a bias in favour of the employee. What then are the likely rules to be 
formulated? These can easily be found in other legislation and Codes of Practice especially those concerning 
privacy of personal data. Refer for instance to NSW Government (1996, 1988), ILO (1997), OECD (1980), 
Australian Government (1988). Those “fair” rules relevant to workplace surveillance include: 
1. Information collected is necessary for the performance of organisational functions and employees will 
be informed of this. This recognises that employers have a right to monitor employee activities and 
resource usage. Based on the “difference principle” the onus is on the employer to justify such 
monitoring. 
2. Information is collected where practicable from the employee. This recognises that in some 
circumstances the information can be directly obtained from the employee. 
3. Employees will be informed about who is collecting the information. 
4. Employees will be informed how they may access the information relating to them and how to make 
corrections if necessary. 
5. Employees will be informed about who else has access to the information relating to them and why. 
6. Employers must ensure information on employees is accurate, complete and current for the 
organisational purpose. 
7. Employers must take reasonable measures to protect information from misuse, loss, unauthorised 
access, modification or disclosure. 
8. Employers must provide and actively publicise “best practice” policy on email use and the 
consequences of not abiding by the guidelines 
9. Employers must provide and actively publicise “best practice” policy on network use and the 
consequences of not abiding by the guidelines. 
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10. Employers must provide and actively publicise a clearly expressed current policy on the collection, 
storage, use and management of employee information 
THE WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE ACT 2005 
On the 23 June 2005 the Workplace Surveillance Bill was assented to in the parliament of the Australian state of 
New South Wales (NSW). It is one of the few examples of specific workplace surveillance legislation in the 
world (referred to in this paper as the Act). The Act extends the regulatory scheme in the Workplace 
Surveillance Act 1998 that concerned video to two other forms of surveillance. These are tracking and the 
computer, including monitoring of employees’ emails and internet browsing. Employees are defined broadly 
under the Act as “at work” which means at a workplace or another place while working. It prohibits the 
following: 
1. Camera, computer and tracking surveillance unless employees have been notified in the manner 
specified by the Bill or in the case of covert surveillance it has been authorised by a magistrate for the 
purpose of establishing whether an employee is involved in any unlawful activity at work. 
2. Camera, computer and tracking surveillance in any change room, toilet or shower facility. 
3. Employer blocking delivery of an email or access to a website unless the employer has a policy on 
email and internet access and is acting in accordance with that policy and in the case of emails the 
employee is notified that delivery of an email has been blocked (except for certain emails eg offensive, 
SPAM). The employer’s policy cannot provide for blocking merely because the email/website relates to 
industrial matters. 
The response to its preparation and subsequent debate indicates the reality when the conflicted participants do 
not operate behind a “veil of ignorance”. It also underlines why it necessary for the State to legislate to ensure 
some measure of fairness in the workplace. First, because the parties position on rights are significantly different, 
often intransigent. Second, because there is the recognition that power largely rests with the employer. 
The Labour Party governs NSW. It is a party that historically developed from organised labour and has close ties 
with the union movement. Such legislation is more likely from the Labour Party than the main opposition 
coalition of the conservative parties of Liberal and National Party who opposed the Act. The coalition argued the 
Act was biased in favour of the employees. The Democrats (centrist party) and the Greens (left of centre party) 
both argued the Act was an improvement in better securing privacy rights but it was weak especially in 
enforcement. 
In tabling the draft Bill in Parliament the minister responsible stressed how new technologies had dramatically 
changed the workplace. However, these bring risks to individual privacy but also create problems for employers 
with overuse of email and downloading and dissemination of inappropriate material. The minister indicated that 
the government will not tolerate secret monitoring of private telephone calls and conversations, cameras in 
change rooms and toilets and “bosses snooping into the private emails of workers”. The minister also stated that 
“ the government recognises these competing entitlements and seeks to strike the right balance between privacy 
rights and business interests”. 
The Labour Council of NSW, the peak body for trade unions, predictably supported the extension of the current 
regulatory regime (on video) to computer and tracking surveillance. It argued that the Bill should have gone 
further and included biometrics.  
Equally predictably, the Australian Retailers Association argued that the legislation was not needed and that self 
regulation was adequate. Moreover, it argued that employers should not be required to seek approval from a 
magistrate to use covert surveillance. Both the NSW Chamber of Commerce and Australian Business Industrial 
Support, peak bodies of employers, agree with the Retailers. They also argued that the notice requirements will 
impose substantial costs on business and that the prohibition on blocking union emails is unreasonable. They 
also refer to the problem of different State/ Territory legislation for business that operate across state/ territory 
borders as problems created for business. 
Without the “veil of ignorance” the creation of just (fair) rules on the distribution of privacy and surveillance 
rights would be very unlikely given the significantly different views of employees and employers. Given that 
power largely rests with the employers then the prospect of a fair distribution of rights requires the intervention 
of the State. 
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THE NSW ACT AND RAWLS THEORY 
If we accept that the rules previously discussed are likely outcomes from Rawls theory then to what degree to 
they apply to the Act. It should be viewed as a positive attempt by the Government of New South Wales to 
establish just rules on the distribution of privacy and surveillance rights. However, it is seriously deficient when 
evaluated against the rules established from Rawls theory. The deficiencies emanate from a rigid distinction 
drawn between overt and covert surveillance and its associated prohibited surveillance. Covert surveillance is 
defined as “surveillance of an employee while at work for an employer carried out or caused to be carried out by 
an employer and not carried out in compliance with the requirements of Part 2”. Part 2 is mainly concerned with 
the notice requirements that employers must provide to employees including some additional requirements 
associated with each of three surveillance types of cameras, computer and tracking. Overt surveillance is not 
defined in the Act but covers all other surveillance (other than covert and prohibited) activities. 
The Act prohibits any surveillance of employee change rooms or toilet/ shower/ bath facility at the workplace. 
For some it may be a surprise that this must be legislated against at all as most would consider it a clear case of 
violation of personal territorial privacy.  However, numerous instances of this surveillance are reported usually 
when some one is charged with sexual gratification under the Summary Offences Act. As an aside the Act does 
not cover surveillance in these places of non employees, for example, customers or general members of the 
public. Thus, hidden cameras in public toilets or changing rooms of retail stores are not prohibited by this Act 
nor is this adequately covered by other legislation. 
 It also prohibits surveillance of an employee who is not at work unless the employee has the use of equipment 
or resources provided by the employer (presumably to be used at home for work purposes). Thus, tracking 
devices on work provided vehicles or mobile phones for instance will effectively track employees on the road or 
at home. 
Again, the Act prohibits the blocking of emails and internet access of employees. However, if an employer acts 
in accordance with an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) that has been publicised to the employee then it is lawful. In 
the case of blocking the delivery of an email the employer must give a “prevented delivery notice” as soon as 
practicable to the employee. There are exceptions to this requirement. One is if the email was Spam, under the 
definition of the Federal Spam Act 2003, and it might damage the network or is menacing, harassing or offensive 
and, the employer was not aware (and could not be reasonable expected to be aware) of the identity of the 
employee who sent it. The Act also specifically prohibits reference in the AUP to blocking emails or internet 
access solely for the reason industrial matters (presumably trade union). 
Part 4 of the Act deals with covert surveillance of employees at work and is prohibited unless authorised by a 
magistrate as necessary to establish whether an employee is engaged in unlawful activity. The exceptions are law 
enforcement, correctional centres, casino and courts. However, the positive impact of this regulation on privacy 
is likely to be undermined by allowing justification by employers claiming surveillance is justified on the 
grounds of security. 
 The Act makes a distinction between Covert and Overt Surveillance. This distinction is deficient First, there is 
no regulation of overt surveillance beyond the employer requirement to meet the notice and other requirements. 
Apart from notification and signage requirements most of the fair rules associated with the collection, storage, 
use, disclosure, accessibility and accuracy of information obtained through overt surveillance are violated. The 
Act requires that notice be given as whether surveillance is camera or computer or tracking), how it will be 
carried out, when the surveillance will begin, whether it will be intermittent and whether it will be for a specified 
period or ongoing. The Act is silent on the more important privacy concerns of which specific area(s) is 
surveillance to be undertaken, the specific purpose(s) for it, employee access to personal information, a 
mechanism to correct any inaccuracies and disclosure to other parties. It also does not require a consultation 
process with employees on matters like the nature and capacities of the surveillance devices, how the data 
collected will be used, how any disputes can be settled or mechanisms for ongoing consultation.  
Second, the Act may place employers at risk at meeting notice requirements through forgetfulness or accident 
and transform overt surveillance into covert surveillance. The Australian Privacy Foundation - APF (2005) 
provide an example where “the employer who accidentally gives only 13 instead of 14 days prior notice to 
employees that she is taking delivery of new fleet cars which will have their GPS systems switched on”. The 
APF (2005) also provide the example where “a home owner who has installed a CCTV system to protect their 
home employs a person (say a nanny) and forgets to provide the nanny with written notice of its existence”. The 
homeowner as employer is in breach of the Act. 
Third, the Act may impact the privacy of other persons other than employees and employers. Clause 14 of the 
Act allows for surveillance of the workplace for purposes other than that of employees so long as a substantial 
number of employees have agreed to do so. It would appear that customers or members of the public could be 
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subject to surveillance and without none of the notification, visibility or signage requirements. It may allow 
CCTV for example in foyers or public toilets. 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Rawls theory of justice as fairness is offered as a means to assist us with the practical issue of workplace privacy 
and surveillance. It is an issue where a conflicting interest exists. A conflict between the privacy interests of 
employees against the organisational goals of the employers. Surveillance can assist organisational goals in 
terms of effective and efficient resource allocation but can violate the privacy of the organisation’s employees. 
Distributive justice is a means by which rules of justice may be used to make decisions that resolves a conflict. 
Our context is workplace surveillance. It recognises that whilst a just negotiated set of rules between employees 
and employers may be possible it is unlikely. First, because of the significant different views of employees and 
employers. Second, because of the distribution of bargaining power overwhelmingly rests with employers. A 
better approach is to identify those rules to distribute workplace privacy and surveillance rights that would be 
formed behind the “veil of ignorance” and enforce them  by legislation. 
Using Rawls theory of justice a number of rules for distributing workplace privacy and surveillance rights 
behind the veil of ignorance were proposed. The NSW Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 was evaluated in terms 
of these fair rules. The NSW parliament is commended for passage of the legislation as one of the few in the 
world to specifically seek to balance the conflict of interests between employee privacy and the organisational 
goals of the employer. However, it represents a missed opportunity to do so as it fails to regulate overt 
surveillance beyond some signage and notification problems. In particular the employee is denied the right to 
know what is the specific purpose of the surveillance, to have access to information about them, together with a 
mechanism to challenge and correct any inaccuracies, and, little security against loss, unauthorised access, use, 
alteration or disclosure of such information.  The Act may also allow employers to conduct covert surveillance 
of employees while not at work and those of customers and visitors to the workplace. 
ICT professionals should be concerned about the ethical use of artefacts, whether surveillance, censorship, crime 
or terrorism for example. All influential professional bodies of the ICT domain have Codes of Conduct or Codes 
of Ethics. Individual ICT professionals should act in accordance with these codes. The Professional Society 
should exercise leadership in pro-active promotion of the Codes and seeking compliance. They should also 
actively promote discussion on important ethical and societal issues, like workplace surveillance, and where 
necessary adopt a position on an important issue. The ICT professional cannot have recourse as a defence “not 
my problem”. 
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